Can Bangladesh’s media be truly free and fair in the upcoming days?

Illustration: TBS

In the wake of the July uprising and the fall of the Awami League government on 5 August 2024, questions about press freedom have become more urgent than ever. 

In an interview with The Business Standard, Dr Md Khorshed Alam, Associate Professor at Dhaka University's Department of Mass Communication and Journalism—who also taught at the University of Mississippi from 2022 to 2024—explains that despite the proliferation of television channels and media outlets over the past two decades, independent voices remain scarce. Ownership concentration and political influence shape narratives, leaving many journalists caught between external pressure and self-censorship.

While the interim government has eased some political controls, attacks on media and threats against journalists persist. Social media has increasingly become the primary arena for dissent, reflecting public distrust of traditional outlets, which often echo ruling interests. Although power dynamics have shifted, structural challenges within the media remain deeply entrenched.

What does "free and fair media" actually mean in the context of present-day Bangladesh?

Free and fair media is not unique to any one country; it has global significance. Fundamentally, it is linked to freedom of expression and press independence. The key question is whether a country's media truly has the right and freedom to report as it wishes.

Bangladesh's media has expanded considerably over the past 15–20 years. Between 1997 and 2006, licences were issued to 53 television channels, around 40 of which are currently broadcast. Despite this growth, diversity of opinion remains limited, and dissenting views are largely absent.

A major reason is centralised ownership: the Bashundhara Group controls seven outlets, and the Gemcon Group owns four. Although names differ, much content reflects similar narratives, suppressing critical perspectives.

International press freedom indices rank Bangladesh low. During the July movement, people relied more on social media, distrusting traditional outlets. Attacks on BTV, Somoy Television, and journalists suggest conventional media often functions more as a propaganda tool than a public platform. Bangladesh's media remains far from fully independent.

How much has the media landscape in Bangladesh changed compared to a decade or one and a half decades ago? 

Comparing the Awami League government from 2009 to 2024 with the current government after August 2024, there has been some change, but not a very significant one.

During the previous government, a clear nexus existed between the ruling party, the corporate sector, intelligence agencies, and the media. That nexus is weaker now, but a new attempt to extend influence has emerged.

Sketch: TBS

This is evident in channel licensing. Between 2009 and 2024, around 37 television channels were approved, most under the Awami League. Under the current government, two channels—Live and Nexus—received licences through student leaders and advisers in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The individuals involved have limited journalistic experience and face allegations of political ties, making the process appear unfair.

Dissenting voices remain limited. Allegations of political pressure persist, and while the environment is somewhat better, it still falls short of the desired standard.

Is there any progress in implementing the recommendations of the Media Reform Commission?

Regrettably, there has been no visible progress so far. Among the eleven commissions, the Media Reform Commission made significant recommendations, including the "one house, one media" policy, discouraging cross-ownership, establishing a broadcasting commission for electronic media, and creating an independent press council for print media. Yet, no effective measures to implement these have been observed.

We have also not heard any clear stance or commitment on this from those likely to form the recently formed government—particularly the BNP. In my view, this is a crucial moment. Political parties should clearly state which media reform recommendations they would implement if they come to power, and how.

What kinds of pressures do you think Bangladeshi journalists are most likely to face in the coming years—political, corporate, or self-censorship?

The three types of pressures you mentioned—political, corporate or advertising-dependent, and self-regulation—have long been part of Bangladeshi journalism. None are new. The core crisis of the media is structural, not the fault of any single political party.

Whichever party comes to power tends to control the media. Outlets reporting independently are often pressured. The nature of future pressures will depend on the government and its approach to media governance.

Since independence, three parties—Awami League, BNP, and Jatiya Party—have held power. The Jatiya Party's chances are negligible; focus is on BNP or Jamaat.

BNP's past approach has been relatively positive. During Ziaur Rahman's rule (1977–1981) and later periods (1991–1996, 2001–2006), initiatives included establishing the Press Council, Bangladesh Press Institute, National Media Institute, Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha, and allocating land for press clubs. In the early 1990s, several first-tier daily newspapers, private television channels, universities, and hospitals were approved, expanding the media landscape.

Negatives included ETV's closure in 2001 and allegations of irregularities in government advertising—a problem worsened under the Awami League.

Considering these experiences, optimism is limited. Yet if BNP comes to power under Tarique Rahman, a comparatively more positive approach toward the media might be expected. The key remains implementing the Media Reform Commission's recommendations. Since the problems are institutional, establishing an independent broadcasting commission and a truly independent press council is essential for free and fair media.

Is populism or audience-pleasing behaviour in Bangladeshi media intensifying over time?

To understand populism in the media, we must first view it as an industry. Like any industry, its primary goal is to maximise profit. In media, the product is content, and selling it is the main objective.

We live in a viral-driven age. Many outlets earn more from social media monetisation than traditional advertising. The more likes, comments, and shares a piece generates, the higher the revenue, pushing media toward populist, emotionally driven framing.

The media often amplify narratives already dominant in society. For example, an isolated incident of violence in an Indian village may be reported as representative of the entire country, distorting facts and potentially harming Bangladesh's diplomatic and security realities.

Bangladeshi media lag for two main reasons: a shortage of skilled journalists capable of multi-perspective analysis and fact verification, and financial unprofitability, which pushes outlets toward populist content, political influence, or even legitimising illicit funds.

Against this backdrop, an independent broadcasting commission and effective press council are essential. Research-driven approval of specialised or thematic channels, rather than a proliferation of general ones, is the way forward, as reflected in the Media Reform Commission's reports.

We are seeing many fact-checking based media appearing nowadays. How essential is fact-checking in Bangladeshi media today? 

Fact-checking is an inseparable part of journalism. Reporters must verify the accuracy, reliability, credibility, and objectivity of material before preparing a report. Ideally, verification is embedded in every journalist's workflow.

Once drafted, reports go to copy editors or sub-editors for further checks before passing through newsroom 'gatekeeping' stages. If this system functions properly, a separate fact-checking unit may not be necessary.

In practice, however, verification often fails due to a lack of skilled personnel and institutional training. The digital age has compounded this challenge, with disinformation, fake news, and deepfakes making technical expertise essential.

Given this, a dedicated fact-checking unit is crucial. If not possible, media organisations should outsource or train journalists in structured verification methods. Social media increasingly drives mainstream news, making verification more critical than ever.

Fact-checking must be impartial. Selective verification—rapidly validating criticism of the government while ignoring serious issues—undermines credibility. Any information of public interest should be verified fairly and without bias.

To what extent does the self-censorship that developed among journalists over the previous governments still persist? How deeply can the environment affect a journalist mentally?

The issue of journalists' safety has always been critical and legitimate. History shows this insecurity is long-standing in the Indian subcontinent. From the 1954 Pakistan Press Commission to the 1960 and 1984 commissions (led by Justice Muhammad Munir and Ataur Rahman Khan), the 1990 Mujibur Rahman Commission, the 1997 Asafuddin Commission, and most recently the 2025 Kamal Ahmed Commission, one recurring theme has been journalists' safety.

These commissions addressed not only physical security but also salaries, social status, and professional protection. Journalists in the region have never been fully secure—it is structural. Under the Awami League government over the past 15 years, the crisis deepened. Many journalists disappeared and many were forced into self-censorship, left the country, or changed professions.

The interim government has produced a new crisis, which is 'mobocracy'. Weak law enforcement has allowed attacks on Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, vandalism, and arson. Journalists continue to be threatened or injured, pushing them further into self-censorship. Labels like 'pro-Pakistani' have evolved into accusations of being 'agents of India' or 'Islamophobic'.

Future improvement depends on a democratically elected government, but systemic change is essential. Strict measures must be taken against those threatening journalists. A partial positive development is the 2023 reform of the Digital Security Act, replaced by the Cyber Security Act, relaxing controversial provisions—a step that may benefit journalists.

What problems exist regarding journalists' salaries, and how does this affect their professional security and impartial reporting?

Journalists' salaries and remuneration have long been a problem in Bangladesh. Many distressing stories have come from journalists themselves, and the issue persists. The effective implementation of the wage board has been indefinitely delayed. Without financial security, journalists become professionally vulnerable, and corruption can emerge. Financial stability is crucial for maintaining journalism as a professional vocation.

The Media Reform Commission recommended that journalists' salaries start at the level of first-class gazetted officers and that a wage board be implemented in every media outlet. However, most media organisations are not profitable, making timely payment difficult.

Salary inconsistencies are widespread. Outside major Dhaka outlets, many do not follow the wage board, and employees often lack formal contracts, receiving only ID cards or temporary letters. This leaves journalists' rights and security uncertain.

In short, inadequate salaries and financial insecurity undermine journalists' professional status, safety, and ability to report independently.

Why do students studying journalism in Bangladesh appear increasingly reluctant to enter the profession?

Many universities in Bangladesh now have departments of mass communication or journalism. However, students show limited interest in pursuing it as a career, mainly because it is neither safe nor financially secure and lacks social prestige.

To provide practice-oriented education, several measures are needed. Media production, content creation, and media studies should be clearly distinguished. Logistic and infrastructure support—studios, editing panels, and cameras—must be ensured. Internships and practical training should be longer for real-world experience. Closer collaboration with media outlets will allow networking and practical learning. Institutional training through the National Institute of Mass Media and the Press Institute of Bangladesh should be compulsory nationwide.

A certification system should be established to ensure aspiring journalists are professionally competent and ethically responsible.

In short, making journalism attractive requires financial security, professional training, social recognition, and hands-on experience. Without these, students will remain disinterested, and the profession's quality cannot improve.

How free and fair do you think Bangladeshi media can be in the coming years?

It is difficult to give a precise answer, but one can speak in terms of expectations. Following the interim government, any incoming administration will likely be aware of media mismanagement and the mafia nexus that developed previously. A commission has made recommendations, and I hope the better proposals will be reviewed and implemented. 

I am cautiously optimistic, partly because BNP's past record on media is comparatively better. Unlike the Awami League, BNP traditionally accommodates diverse views, which could encourage cultural pluralism. Pressure on the government and awareness among journalists remain essential for improving professional standards and media independence.