From mega projects to meaningful outcomes: Why Bangladesh must reform its infrastructure delivery system

Large infrastructure projects are meant to unlock growth, improve services, and enhance quality of life. Yet in Bangladesh, many high-value projects continue to fall short of their promised benefits due to chronic gaps in implementation capacity and weak post-completion operational management. 

The result is delayed utilisation, wasted public resources, and benefits projected in feasibility studies that remain largely unrealised.

Several recent examples illustrate this systemic problem.

The third terminal of Hazrat Shahjalal International Airport has been physically near-ready for almost a year. However, the process of appointing an operator started very late. 

This delay has caused direct wastage of resources, rapid depreciation of sophisticated electronic systems due to non-operation, and, critically, the loss of effective use of the defect liability period.

A similar fate has affected the Pangaon Container Port, which has remained underutilised for long periods due to the absence of an operator. Despite significant investment, only a fraction of its potential has been realised, turning a strategic logistics asset into an idle facility.

In the transport sector, MRT Line 6 began operations without comprehensive safety audits or adequate equipment to inspect infrastructure and operational safety. 

Operations started roughly a year after physical completion, mainly because staff recruitment and training began too late. This delay undermined both safety preparedness and service efficiency.

Railway projects present another stark example. The Dhaka–Cox's Bazar railway and the Dhaka–Khulna Padma rail link have failed to deliver the expected level of service as projected in their feasibility studies, primarily due to shortages of rolling stock and skilled human resources.

Despite the massive investment in infrastructure, the absence of adequate locomotives, coaches, and trained personnel has severely constrained operational capacity. 

This mismatch between physical infrastructure and service readiness undermines public confidence, delays the realisation of economic benefits, and risks turning flagship projects into underutilized assets.

The Padma Bridge further highlights planning failures. Originally envisioned as part of an economic corridor to stimulate planned development in the south-west and support decentralisation of Dhaka, the complementary planning never materialised. 

Instead, the bridge has become counterproductive by funnelling even more traffic into an already overburdened capital.

At the core of these issues lies a development approval system that prioritises physical construction while neglecting land use planning, institutional readiness, and operational management. 

The Planning Commission typically approves projects based on ambitious benefit projections, without a clear, integrated mechanism for full implementation or clarity on responsibility for operations. 

As a result, service-oriented projects often end with incomplete readiness, reducing utility and rendering feasibility study projections effectively meaningless.

In contrast, other countries define service- or land use–oriented development projects as integrated packages. Physical works, staffing, operational systems, rolling stock, and institutional capacity are planned together. 

These countries also conduct mandatory ex-post evaluations to compare what was promised in feasibility studies with what was actually achieved, ensuring accountability.

In Bangladesh, such accountability is largely absent. Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED) lacks the technical capacity to undertake rigorous ex-post evaluations. 

This creates a perverse incentive where overly optimistic outcomes and GDP contributions are promised to secure approval, with little fear of later verification. The result is leakage, wastage, and minimal value for money.

To address this, structural reform is essential. The Planning Commission should not approve service-oriented projects unless all components required for timely operation are included, such as staff recruitment, training, rolling stock, operators, and synchronised operational readiness. 

Responsibility for incomplete or defective project proposals must rest jointly with implementing agencies and the Planning Commission.

Bangladesh must shift from fragmented, construction-focused development to system-driven development. 

This requires making feasibility studies meaningful and accountable, introducing mandatory ex-post evaluations, and restructuring both the Planning Commission and IMED with technically specialised, non-transferable professionals who can retain institutional knowledge.

As the apex development approval body, the Planning Commission itself should lead this reform process. 

Structural reform must be continuous, embedded within the executive branch, and guided by national interest rather than departmental convenience. Countries with strong governance reform their institutions repeatedly, learning from project outcomes to improve future performance.

Recent administrative decisions have further weakened the Planning Commission's (PC) planning and development capacity. 

The merger of the Economic Cadre with the General Cadre has diluted specialised economic expertise, while the abolition of provisions for recruiting professional planners and infrastructure experts from outside the civil service has hollowed out technical capacity. 

Despite its name, the Planning Commission now risks becoming an administrative body without planners. 

The PC is increasingly acting merely as a sectoral project approval and budgetary allocation authority, rather than serving as the institution responsible for integrated, long-term spatial and physical development planning for Bangladesh. 

No country can achieve sustainable development without strong planning expertise and a clear long-term vision.

Given that internal reform has proven difficult, political leadership becomes crucial. Whichever party forms the next government will bear responsibility for undertaking long-overdue reforms if it truly intends to deliver not just mega physical projects, but efficient, multimodal, and sustainable development outcomes.

The stakes are high. Without these difficult but necessary reforms, risks to long-term national prosperity are profound. 

This concern echoes the work of 2024 Nobel laureates Simon Johnson and James Robinson, who emphasise that competent institutions and continuous reform are fundamental to economic development. 

For Bangladesh, the message is clear: without institutional strength and accountability, infrastructure spending will continue to deliver concrete structures, but not the prosperity they promise.

Md Shamsul Hoque is a Professor of Civil Engineering at Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET)