After the Iran war: A new middle east takes shape

The US-Iran war has already altered the strategic landscape of the Middle East, even though the conflict remains unresolved. After months of fighting, intermittent ceasefires and negotiations, the Strait of Hormuz remains at the centre of confrontation. Iran continues to link the reopening of the waterway to changes in US policy, while Washington seeks guarantees on maritime security.

Whatever the eventual terms of a settlement, the Middle East is unlikely to return to the status quo ante. The war has exposed vulnerabilities in the region's security architecture, inflicted enormous damage on Iran, intensified Israel's security concerns and encouraged Gulf states to seek security arrangements beyond dependence on a single external power.

Iran: Weakened, but unlikely to be defeated

Iran will probably emerge from the war severely damaged. Its military infrastructure, energy facilities, transport networks and wider economy have suffered substantial disruption. Yet it would be a mistake to equate physical destruction with strategic defeat.

Iran has demonstrated remarkable resilience after decades of Western sanctions. Its population, state institutions, geography and national identity remain intact, providing the foundations for recovery. The country may emerge militarily weaker and economically poorer, but politically more determined to prevent another war.

The central question will be how Tehran responds. It could seek accommodation with the West, but a more likely outcome is a combination of diplomacy, economic adaptation, asymmetric capabilities and deeper relations with China, Russia and other non-Western partners.

The war could therefore produce an unusual paradox: a weaker Iran in material terms, but a more strategically determined Iran.

Israel: Stronger militarily, but facing a harder political environment

Israel is likely to emerge with greater confidence in its ability to strike Iranian targets, but military superiority will not necessarily translate into lasting security.

Israel will still face the unresolved Palestinian issue, instability in Lebanon and the continuing challenge of Iran's regional relationships. War may temporarily strengthen its deterrence, but repeated military confrontations without a political settlement could leave the region trapped in a cycle of escalation.

For Israel, therefore, the post-war challenge will be to convert military gains into a sustainable regional order. That will require diplomacy as much as deterrence.

The Gulf: The end of unquestioned dependence on Washington

Perhaps the most important consequence of the war will be felt in the Gulf.

For decades, the United States has been the principal external security provider for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. American military power, bases, intelligence capabilities and defence partnerships remain indispensable.

But the war has demonstrated that the US security umbrella cannot be regarded as the region's sole or unquestioned guarantee of security.

Gulf states are consequently likely to diversify their security partnerships. They will retain close relations with Washington while strengthening indigenous air and missile defence, maritime security and intelligence cooperation, and developing closer strategic relationships with Türkiye, Pakistan, China, India and European powers.

Saudi Arabia is already moving in this direction.

The Mecca Pact and the rise of regional security arrangements

The signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan on August 7 is an important indication of this changing landscape.

The pact should not yet be regarded as a fully developed NATO equivalent. Its military mechanisms and practical commitments remain to be tested. Nevertheless, its political significance is considerable.

It demonstrates that regional powers are beginning to develop security arrangements of their own rather than relying exclusively on an external guarantor.

Maritime security becomes a new pillar

A second important development is the Saudi-led maritime defence initiative involving 14 countries, including Bangladesh. The initiative seeks to protect freedom of navigation and commercial shipping around the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

This is significant because the Middle East's security problem is no longer confined to land borders and airspace. The war has demonstrated the strategic vulnerability of maritime chokepoints and security by becoming more collective, more maritime and less dependent on a single great power.

The emergence of a multinational maritime arrangement therefore points towards a broader regional trend:

A more multipolar Middle East

The post-war Middle East is likely to be more multipolar.

The United States will remain the most powerful external military actor, but its influence will increasingly coexist with China's economic weight, Russia's diplomatic role, Türkiye's growing regional influence and Saudi Arabia's emergence as a more autonomous Arab power.

The traditional equation—America provides security, Iran challenges the regional order, Israel provides military deterrence and the Gulf states depend on Washington—is already changing.

A new equation may gradually emerge: US support combined with regional collective security, diversified external partnerships and greater strategic autonomy.

What does it mean for Bangladesh?

For Bangladesh, the consequences are both economic and strategic.

The most immediate concern is energy. Bangladesh depends heavily on imported fuel, and disruption around Hormuz can raise the cost of oil, gas, fertiliser and transportation. The conflict has demonstrated how instability in the Gulf can transmit inflationary pressures thousands of kilometres away.

The second concern is remittance. Millions of Bangladeshis work in the Gulf, making the stability of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Oman directly relevant to Bangladesh's economy. Disruption of employment and economic activity can affect both migrant workers and remittance flows.

The third is maritime security. Bangladesh's participation in the Saudi-led maritime initiative gives Dhaka a stake in protecting freedom of navigation from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. This should, however, be approached primarily through maritime security, international law and protection of commercial shipping rather than bloc politics.

Bangladesh will need to maintain a careful balance. Its interests lie in stable relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, good relations with the United States, constructive engagement with China and other Asian powers, and a principled diplomatic relationship with Iran.

A new strategic era

The end of the US-Iran war will not end instability in the Middle East. It may instead mark the beginning of a new phase.

Iran will be damaged but resilient. Israel may emerge militarily stronger but politically more challenged. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states will seek greater strategic autonomy. Türkiye and Pakistan will acquire greater security relevance, while China and Russia will have greater space to influence the regional order.

Most importantly, the Middle East will no longer be defined simply by an American security umbrella.

The war may eventually end. But the strategic transformation it has unleashed is unlikely to do so.

Brigadier General Mustafa Kamal Rusho (Retd) is a Research Director in Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies (OCPASS). 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.