When the state steps back, the mob steps in

Highlight:

• Public concern over mob violence also increased
• A July 2025 Voice for Reform–BIGD poll found that 80% of respondents were worried about mob violence, compared with 7% who had identified law and order as a top concern in October 2024

On 9 August, in Taraganj, Rangpur, cobbler Ruplal Das, 40, pleaded with the crowd surrounding him. "I am not a thief; I am a cobbler who mends shoes in Taraganj Bazaar," he cried. Beside him sat his relative Pradeep Lal, 35, who had been accused of drugging and robbing van-pullers. When one man suggested calling the police, another shouted, "You are the father of all thieves!"

The crowd beat the two men until they collapsed. Ruplal died at the local health complex, while Pradeep later died at Rangpur Medical College Hospital. Ruplal's wife, Bharati Rani, filed a murder case against 700 unnamed people. Police later arrested four after reviewing viral footage.

Bharati's summary was simpler: "They didn't listen."

The incident came after Sheikh Hasina was ousted on 5 August 2024 and fled to India. Professor Muhammad Yunus took office on 8 August with a mandate to restore order, reform institutions and turn the uprising's promise into state capacity. The inability or unwillingness to confront mob violence became a symbol of wider institutional failure.

Between September 2024 and January 2026, the Human Rights Support Society documented at least 413 incidents of mob violence and lynching, leaving 259 people dead and 313 injured.

Human rights activist Noor Khan Liton said, "Mob violence reached such a level that state forces failed to take adequate action. Various offices were attacked by mobs."

"During this time, the presence of some invisible forces was observed. As a result, the character, activism, and ideals of the mass uprising became blurred," he added.

During the government's first seven months, HRSS recorded 114 mob incidents, with 119 people killed and 74 injured. The Manobadhikar Sangskriti Foundation counted 78 deaths between January and July 2025, rising to 87 deaths and 266 injuries by 10 August.

Ain o Salish Kendra recorded 111 killings from 1 January to 10 August. In the first 10 days of August alone, 13 attacks left nine people dead and 13 injured.

Mobs settled scores, silenced dissent, attacked journalists and minority communities, stormed police stations and intervened in legal disputes. More than 200 protests also took place in Dhaka after the change of government.

Clashes between students and Ansar members injured more than 40 people on 25 August 2024. On 11 September, Mohammad Farokul Islam led an assault on women in Cox's Bazar. On 18 September, a mentally ill man was killed at Dhaka University and a former student leader was lynched at Jahangirnagar University.

Later, mobs attacked the offices of Prothom Alo and The Daily Star, vandalising the premises and slaughtering a cow outside. In February, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Dhanmondi 32 residence was demolished after social-media calls for a "Bulldozer Procession".

A women's football match was stopped in January, while two women were assaulted in March for smoking. In May, the NCP besieged the Chief Adviser's residence with 25,000 supporters. In July, NCP rallies in Gopalganj and Cox's Bazar were attacked.

Criminologist Dr Tawohidul Haque warned that mob behaviour spreads "like a communicable disease".

"If this mob is accepted somewhere, or if the opportunity is given for it to gain social, legal, or political legitimacy, then various people take advantage of it in various ways. If just one or two such incidents were punished, today's situation would not exist," he said.

He also explained the police's hesitation: "They did not receive any strong comments or instructions from the government. So they are haunted by fear of reprisal, criticism, or departmental action."

After Dhanmondi 32 was destroyed, the Chief Adviser's Office called it "undesirable" but blamed Hasina's "provocative speech" abroad. Only after criticism did the government promise "immediate and strict action".

The army later declared "zero tolerance". Its deployment reduced some attacks, but the response also showed how force could precede law and still influence outcomes.

Between October and December, ahead of the 13th parliamentary election, seven people were killed and 1,403 injured in 155 election-related incidents.

Inqilab Moncho spokesperson Shahid Sharif Osman bin Hadi died in Singapore after being shot in Paltan. Nomination disputes caused deaths in Chattogram, Mymensingh and elsewhere.

Journalists were attacked 427 times: six were killed and 834 were assaulted or harassed. A total of 222 journalists were accused in 49 cases.

Under the Cyber Security Act and Cyber Protection Ordinance, 69 people were accused in 41 cases and 33 were arrested, mostly over social-media content.

Minority communities faced 56 attacks, leaving one person dead and 27 injured. Seventeen temples, 63 idols and 65 homes were attacked, while more than 100 shrines were vandalised.

At the borders, 43 Bangladeshis were killed in 110 incidents, with three more killed along the Bangladesh-Myanmar frontier.

Violence also affected 2,617 women and children, including 1,016 rape victims. Another 478 children died from abuse. Hundreds of workers were killed or injured through labour abuse and workplace accidents.

HRSS compiled its report from 15 national dailies and its own sources.

Public concern over mob violence also increased. A July 2025 Voice for Reform–BIGD poll found that 80% of respondents were worried about mob violence, compared with 7% who had identified law and order as a top concern in October 2024.

Sixty-one per cent feared going out at night, while 56% feared for women's safety. A SANEM youth survey found that 71% believed mob justice affected daily life, while more than 80% worried about arson, theft and wider lawlessness.

Dr Birupaksha Paul, professor of economics at the State University of New York at Cortland, said, "The interim has failed to curb inflation and unemployment."

Anti-corruption reform also stalled. Multiple commissions produced little visible progress; the Iftekharuzzaman committee's recommendations were not implemented, and Bangladesh again became one of South Asia's most corrupt countries.

There were also some institutional achievements. An ordinance freed the judiciary from executive control over appointments, promotions and transfers, a constitutional obligation that had been neglected for 54 years.

The government also temporarily stabilised a banking system ravaged under Hasina, when 11 of 61 banks neared bankruptcy.

Former caretaker government adviser Hossain Zillur Rahman identified three errors: placing bureaucrats in key positions, misguiding young leaders and abandoning reform.

"The Yunus government guided young people in the wrong direction. It taught them the craving for power," he said, arguing that weak guidance damaged discipline, long-term leadership and respect for education.

"From the beginning, they chose a conservative and safe path. Instead of dismantling the old bureaucratic structure, they placed similar bureaucrats in important positions. As a result, the previous system effectively remained in place instead of bringing the desired changes," he said.

"The Yunus government introduced the word 'reform'. Yet they did not pay any attention to the recommendations made by the reform commissions they themselves formed. They threw them into the dustbin. They played a 'reform game'."

The government's historical missions were the 12 February 2026 election and a same-day referendum on the July Charter.

A fair, free and impartial election was intended to be its greatest success. A "Yes" vote was intended to oblige the next parliament to implement constitutional and electoral reforms.

But elections and ordinances cannot compensate for a state that allows crowds to decide who may speak, work, assemble or live.

The police were already discredited under Hasina, when law enforcers killed about 1,500 people and injured around 20,000 during the uprising, many permanently disabled or blinded.

Rebuilding the force required command, accountability and legitimacy; these were not supplied consistently. Extremist penetration and attacks on Chhayanaut, Udichi and major newspapers showed how organised intolerance occupied the vacuum.

The administration's difficulties therefore extended beyond inflation, corruption and stalled reforms. The deeper failure was the inability to prevent mob power from becoming an unofficial institution.

Once the state tolerates the crowd as investigator, judge and executioner, every reform becomes fragile. Bangladesh's experience shows the danger of allowing an uprising against autocracy to be followed by another form of arbitrary power.