Bangladesh’s election code of conduct falls short of addressing digital risks

Bangladesh's Election Commission (EC) has introduced a new code of conduct to govern online campaigning in the upcoming national election. The intent is commendable—to curb mis- and disinformation, encourage responsible online behaviour, and rein in unaccountable digital campaign spending. But as the EC moves forward, what matters most is not intentions or aspirations, but clarity, fairness, and feasibility in policy design and implementation. 

Yet on broad brushstrokes, the new code falls short of addressing well-documented online risks that have eroded electoral integrity and voter trust in recent elections. It remains unclear, for instance, how the EC proposes to dismantle the sophisticated networks of accounts engaged in covert campaigning, or enhance transparency around electoral spending and surrogate arrangements, or indeed ensure incendiary online statements do not spiral into offline violence? 

Covert promotions—where paid endorsements are disguised as organic content—should be explicitly banned, with strict penalties applying to both candidates and their surrogates. Candidates should also be required to disclose all financial and in-kind engagements, including payments, perks, and the specific content commissioned. Similarly, influencers and other promoters must clearly label political content using available tools, such as "Paid partnership with Candidate X" or "Authorised by Candidate Y."

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Anchor speech rules in existing laws and institutions

Generally, electoral commissions worldwide do not directly regulate political discourse. This is because, on the one hand, attempts to actively police every aspect of electioneering risks reducing the EC—already constrained by limited capacity and mandate—to an ineffective micro-regulator that cannot deliver on its core functions; and on the other, impermissible behaviour is already overseen by designated specialised institutions under existing legal frameworks. Instead, the election commissions rely on a polycentric mode of governance, anchoring their mandate on existing frameworks and institutions to ensure effective implementation.

Clause 16 of the new code charts the opposite course, seemingly defining new categories of speech-related misconduct, while sidestepping the question of enforcement altogether. But introducing standalone offences risks confusion, overreach, enforcement challenges, and conflict with fundamental rights. In Uganda, for example, an election guideline requiring political statements to be free of "insulting language" raised questions about what qualifies as "insulting" and who makes that determination, creating risks of compliance uncertainty and enforcement challenges. 

To avoid similar pitfalls, the new code should anchor campaign speech regulation in existing laws while leaving monitoring and enforcement to specialised agencies like the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) and Bangladesh Police. Its role should instead be limited to that of a nodal authority for interagency coordination. Meanwhile, the EC should exercise its rule-making powers only where current speech-related frameworks are inadequate to address specific electoral harms. This diffusion of authority would allow the EC to focus on its core mandates: safeguarding electoral integrity, ensuring transparency, and strengthening accountability. 

Make deals with third parties transparent

Courting votes in favour of a candidate, or expressing political preference and ideological alignment for a certain party, are not inherently problematic. In fact, they can democratise political dialogue, amplify diverse perspectives, and enhance democratic participation. However, the concern lies in opacity, as deals struck by political entities with surrogates—from community and religious leaders to influencers, celebrities, news organisations, and youth groups—often occur in the shadows despite their outsized impact on voters and democratic processes. 

The appeal is understandable: surrogates with more personalised relationships with their supporters can use their authentic voices to distil complex political ideas into simple, relatable messages that reach otherwise hard-to-access constituents. However, our research at Tech Global Institute shows that influencer engagements in emerging democracies globally are shaped by undisclosed payments, corporate deals, government appointments, or coercion. Around 50-70 per cent more engagement is generated when influencers feature politicians or share partisan content, yet nearly 80 per cent of such content carry no disclosure notice. 

Covert promotions—where paid endorsements are disguised as organic content—should be explicitly banned, with strict penalties applying to both candidates and their surrogates. Candidates should also be required to disclose all financial and in-kind engagements, including payments, perks, and the specific content commissioned. Similarly, influencers and other promoters must clearly label political content using available tools, such as "Paid partnership with Candidate X" or "Authorised by Candidate Y." While such disclosure requirements may expose them to risks of political backlash, they have the agency to choose whether to participate, and the overall gains in transparency and voter trust outweigh these concerns.

Globally, electioneering online is coming under increasing oversight. Bangladesh, too, should tighten its digital campaign and financing regulations, oversight, and enforcement.  

Crackdown on covert campaigning

Digital manipulation in elections is rarely about a single "fake news" post. It operates through networks—bots amplifying hashtags, anonymous groups running partisan pages, or third-party agencies running covert campaigns on behalf of candidates, often disguised as organic content or as social and newsworthy information. Tech Global Institute's investigation found that political parties in Bangladesh often use sprawling webs of pages, groups, and verified profiles to disseminate their political messages and ideologies on Facebook, with around 81% of reviewed accounts sharing pro-Awami League content not attributing the party's name or affiliation, compared to 36% of those sharing pro-Bangladesh Nationalist Party content.

To counter this, laws should be enacted that specifically restrict the use of bots, fake accounts, and automated amplification of political content during the electoral period, while also enabling structured coordination with social media platforms. Equally important are robust regulatory oversight and legal enforcement. To ensure effective implementation, the EC should coordinate with bodies that have legal authority, and technical and operational capacity. 

Additionally, the EC should work hand in hand with civil society watchdogs and independent researchers. Cooperation with these groups not only adds an additional layer of accountability but also helps ensure that abuses are exposed in real time. 

Hold platforms accountable

Finally, no set of rules will succeed unless large internet platforms take responsibility and extend their cooperation. As such, any company with at least five million users in Bangladesh—such as Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube—should be subject to the following legally sanctioned obligations that reflect the scale of their influence.

First, during the final week before the election, all new social-issue, electoral, and political ads should be disallowed, and amplification of older content in those categories should be restricted. This would curb malicious networks engaged in covert influence operations and limit partisan influencers from flooding timelines with political content in the crucial final days.

Second, during the campaign period, platforms should appoint a compliance team, or at minimum a dedicated hotline, for round-the-clock election-related enquiries and escalations. This would create a clear channel for the EC and civil society to flag urgent issues that require timely responses.

Third, a public archive of political ads (like Meta's Ad Library) should be maintained by platforms, containing specific details on funders, spending, and targeting criteria. 

Fourth, platforms should facilitate independent fact-checking in coordination with the EC. This could involve providing fact-checkers with real-time access to high-reach and high-risk content, prioritising election-related claims, and ensuring that verified corrections are displayed prominently. Strengthening these partnerships would reduce the spread of misinformation and increase public trust in the integrity of online discourse.

Fifth, within 45 days of the election, platforms should submit a comprehensive post-election report detailing all political ad spending, influencer promotions, and enforcement actions taken against violations. Such reporting would not only enhance transparency but also provide the EC and policymakers with evidence to assess the effectiveness of existing measures. 

To conclude, Bangladesh is entering an era where online campaigning may decide electoral outcomes as much as rallies and door-to-door canvassing. The EC's instinct to regulate is correct. But regulation that is vague, weak, or selectively enforced will not protect democracy—it will endanger it. 

The path forward is clear: tie restrictions to existing laws, enforce disclosure of deals with surrogates, regulate covert campaigning with the help of civil society, and impose real obligations on the platforms that shape our information environment. 

Sketch: TBS

Shahzeb Mahmood is Head of Research at Tech Global Institute.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and views of The Business Standard.