What’s driving our hoarding instinct in the ongoing fuel crisis?

Illustration: TBS

Amid a deepening nationwide fuel crisis, the lines in front of petrol pumps are growing longer. Pumps are showing 'No more fuel' signs. Yet, is the situation really that dire?

Across districts from Pabna to Kurigram, Mymensingh to Netrokona, law enforcement agencies are discovering hoarded fuel in shops, private homes, paddy warehouses, underground tanks, and even cowsheds. In Kurigram, drums of fuel were seized from a political leader's cowshed; in Mymensingh, authorities recovered a staggering 24,000 litres from an underground reserve at a local shop. In Jamalpur, a mobile court recovered 2,500 litres of petrol from a filling station in Sadar upazila yesterday and fined the manager of M/s Jui Enterprise Tk50,000.

In Dinajpur, a mobile court raid yesterday recovered 380 litres of diesel and 34 litres of octane from a house in Birganj upazila and sentenced the owner to seven days' non-rigorous imprisonment. Another mobile court in Birol upazila sentenced a man to five days' non-rigorous imprisonment on Friday night for illegally hoarding and selling fuel. So, this is not just some isolated incident. It clearly shows signs of organised fuel hoarding in anticipation of a price hike and the creation of an artificial fuel shortage.

The state's response has been swift but reactive. Mobile courts have conducted raids, imposing fines and handing down short custodial sentences. The deployment of Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and police at key petrol pumps reflects growing concerns not only about internal hoarding but also about cross-border smuggling, particularly into India, where fuel prices are relatively higher. Yet, the persistence and scale of these recoveries suggest that enforcement, while visible, may not yet be sufficient to deter opportunistic behaviour.

The culture of panic buying and hoarding

This instinct to stockpile is hardly new in Bangladesh. Whenever there is even a whisper of scarcity—be it fuel, LPG, salt, or sugar—ordinary consumers often join the rush, buying more than they immediately need. What begins as precaution quickly turns into panic buying, as people fear being left out of an already strained supply chain.

Longer lines, panic buying, empty shelves, and rising prices reinforce that scarcity, creating a self-fulfilling cycle: the more people hoard, the scarcer the product appears, and the stronger the urge becomes for others to do the same. In this way, hoarding is not confined to opportunistic traders alone; it seeps into everyday behaviour, turning even cautious households into reluctant participants in the crisis economy.

As Dr Samina Luthfa, Professor of Sociology at Dhaka University, explains, "In societies where institutional trust is fragile, people rely more on self-preservation strategies. Hoarding is not just about profit—it is about fear of exclusion. The fear that when you need something most, it will not be available to you. At its core, this is a problem of monitoring and governance. When governance is weak, people fear that they will not be able to access essential goods when they need them. As a result, they resort to panic buying."

She says it is a universal tendency, not something necessarily unique to us: "We saw this during Covid-19, even in the United States, where toilet paper ran out due to widespread hoarding. People are more likely to have this tendency when it comes to essential goods such as food, because they cannot function without them. The same applies to staple foods like rice. If there is even a hint of scarcity, people will instinctively panic buy."

Her observation reframes the crisis: hoarding is not simply behaviour to be punished, but a predictable response in an environment where trust in supply chains and governance is eroding.

If Luthfa diagnoses the behavioural and institutional drivers, Dr Zahid Hussain, former lead economist at the World Bank's Dhaka office, points to the structural roots of the crisis. "There is a clear shortage driven by a mismatch between demand and supply, with demand significantly exceeding available supply," he says.

"There is no way to profit alone in this situation. People have to cooperate with the government in mitigating the crisis. At the same time, the government must reassure people with clear policy and vision," he says.

The govt response requires more promptness

The government is still reassuring that it has no plan to increase fuel prices. State Minister for Power, Energy and Mineral Resources Aninda Islam Amit said on 27 March, "Despite global instability, it has not increased fuel prices. We recognise that a hike in fuel prices leads to rising costs for electricity, public transport, and food commodities. Despite immense pressure from various quarters, the government has no plans to increase fuel prices. To ensure that public hardship does not escalate, the government is providing a daily fuel subsidy of Tk167 crore."

In the meantime, Bangladesh has secured nine liquefied natural gas (LNG) cargoes for April as the government moves to stabilise gas supply amid disruptions caused by the ongoing Middle East conflict, even as the crisis is set to push LNG import subsidies up by around Tk4,500 crore for the month.

However, this may not be a sustainable plan in the long term. As Dr Zahid Hussain said, "Initially, removing price adjustment as an option from the table may not have been wise. By refusing to increase prices in a situation of shortage—perhaps for the sake of popularity—you risk worsening the crisis. It creates fiscal pressure, as the government must absorb the subsidy burden."

He adds, "What the government could have done is clearly communicate that a pricing policy already exists—one based on an automatic formula. Under that system, prices are adjusted regularly, often at the beginning of each month, based on international market conditions. We have seen this before—prices sometimes go up by one or two taka, and sometimes they come down. This automatic pricing mechanism was introduced at the start of the IMF programme, and moving away from it now may not be a prudent decision."

"At the same time, rationing needs to be managed properly. Practices like hoarding fuel in containers must be strictly monitored and stopped through effective oversight. Because ultimately, if the government is buying fuel at higher prices internationally but selling it domestically at a fixed lower price, someone has to bear the cost."

Dr Samina Luthfa is unequivocal about the limits of the current government response. "Now, the question is whether the current monitoring measures are adequate. At this stage, they do not appear to be sufficient. These efforts need to be expanded and, more importantly, enforced swiftly and visibly. There must be clear and immediate consequences for hoarding."

She adds, "For instance, a fine of Tk50,000 for hoarding 28 tonnes of fuel is hardly a deterrent for a petrol pump owner. Therefore, the penalties must be substantial enough to make such misconduct genuinely costly. That is the key point: enforcement must raise the cost of wrongdoing to a level where it is no longer worth the risk."

Ultimately, the current fuel crisis is not solely a failure of the government but the outcome of a global war over which it has no control. What matters now is how the state responds. Effective monitoring, consistent policy signals, and credible governance will be crucial in restoring order and public confidence. If enforcement becomes visible, penalties meaningful, and communication clear, the fuel situation can be stabilised. Crises of this nature test the resilience of the government—but they also offer an opportunity to strengthen it.