Troubled waters: What does a frozen Indus treaty mean for Ganges treaty renewal?

The Ganges River, a sacred waterway in India, and the vital Padma in Bangladesh, serves as a lifeline for hundreds of millions. But the landmark 1996 treaty governing its shared flow stands at a precarious juncture. 

With its 30-year sacred term expiring in 2026, negotiations for renewal are being overshadowed by inflammatory political rhetoric in India and the chilling precedent of the recently suspended Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan, injecting uncertainty into a relationship critical for regional stability.

In the aftermath of the recent Pahalgam terror attack, which claimed 26 lives, India has announced that they are taking the unprecedented step of freezing the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan — a pact that had survived multiple conflicts. 

This action has created palpable anxiety in Dhaka, particularly after prominent Indian politicians like BJP MP Nishikant Dubey publicly called for suspending water supply to Bangladesh. 

On Sunday, Dubey characterised the 1996 Ganga accord as a "mistake" by the then-Congress government in India and explicitly linked water sharing to security, accusing Bangladesh's interim administration (formed after the 2024 ouster of Sheikh Hasina) of harbouring ties to terrorist groups.

This hardline stance, reportedly finding resonance with figures like Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar and influential voices in West Bengal who have historically resisted water-sharing agreements impacting their perceived interests, signals a potential shift. 

It suggests India, as the powerful upper riparian nation in both the Ganges and Indus basins, might increasingly view water control as a geopolitical tool, a prospect that deeply concerns Bangladesh and risks broader regional instability.

Signed nearly three decades ago by then-Prime Ministers HD Deve Gowda of India and Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh, the Ganga Water Treaty was designed to manage the division of waters at the Farakka Barrage, particularly during the critical January-May dry season. India constructed the barrage in 1974 primarily to divert water into the Hooghly River to flush silt and improve navigation for the Kolkata Port. 

However, this diversion significantly impacted downstream flows into Bangladesh, leading to years of negotiation culminating in the 1996 accord, which established specific water-sharing formulas based on measured flows (in cusecs) to ensure Bangladesh received a share, including guaranteed minimums during peak dry periods in April.

For Bangladesh, the stakes could not be higher. The Padma (main distributary of the Ganges) irrigates vast agricultural lands, sustains crucial fisheries, enables river navigation, provides drinking water for millions, and critically, pushes back saltwater intrusion in the country's southwest coastal region. 

This freshwater flow is essential for the health of the Sundarbans, the world's largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage site shared by both nations, protecting it from ecological degradation.

Dr Ainun Nishat, a leading Bangladeshi water expert intimately involved in the original treaty's drafting, voiced grave concerns. He emphasised that India's announcement of backtracking from the Indus treaty "has cast a shadow" over the Ganges treaty renewal talks. 

Critically, he pointed out, the Ganges treaty lacks the third-party arbitration mechanisms present in the Indus pact (brokered by the World Bank), leaving dispute resolution entirely dependent on the "shifting tides of political will" between New Delhi and Dhaka.

The existing treaty, while providing a framework, has not been without challenges. Critics in Bangladesh, including the opposition BNP, have long argued the allocated share is inadequate compared to historical pre-Farakka flows, especially during critically dry years. 

Independent analyses have indicated instances where the actual water received by Bangladesh fell short of the treaty's stipulations. 

Conversely, certain stakeholders in India, particularly in West Bengal — the state through which the Ganges flows before Farakka and which borders Bangladesh — contend the treaty compromises water availability for Kolkata Port operations and local needs. West Bengal's government wields significant political influence domestically and has insisted on being a party to any future Ganges negotiations, adding another layer of complexity.

Under Nobel laureate Prof Mohammed Yunus, the head of Bangladesh's interim government, technical discussions have persisted. 

A meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in Kolkata on 6 March this year suggests both sides recognise the need for continued engagement on managing their 54 shared rivers, including the Ganges and the contentious Teesta.

Furthermore, guiding principles for such cooperation exist within international law, primarily the concepts of equitable and reasonable utilisation and the obligation not to cause significant harm to fellow riparian states. 

Though neither India nor Bangladesh has ratified the key UN water conventions, these tenets are widely accepted as binding customary international law. 

Additionally, the globally recognised human right to water implies a responsibility for states, particularly upper riparians, to manage shared resources in a way that respects the fundamental needs of downstream populations.

But in reality, "water sharing is a purely political matter," according to  Dr Ainun Nishat. "Laws play little role here. Who will you go to have that law enforced? In 1996, the Ganges treaty was signed in a matter of weeks, yet in the previous 40 years, no progress had been made."

As 2026 approaches, failure to renew or replace the treaty could trigger severe water scarcity in Bangladesh, devastating its agricultural heartland, displacing communities, and potentially causing irreversible damage to the fragile Sundarbans ecosystem. 

Experts universally agree that any new agreement must be forward-looking and climate-resilient, explicitly designed to address the increasing volatility of Ganges flows caused by Himalayan glacial melt and more erratic monsoon patterns — realities barely contemplated in 1996. 

"If the Ganges treaty is not renewed, things will take a turn for the worse. Already people in south western Bangladesh are suffering from serious salinity in water. People from southern Satkhira, southern Khulna and Southern Bagerhat are already becoming climate migrants; if the treaty is not renewed things are bound to get worse," said Dr Nishat.

The path ahead demands careful diplomacy, a commitment to international norms, and genuine political consensus, particularly involving key stakeholders like West Bengal. 

Moving beyond security-focused rhetoric towards cooperative, science-based water management is essential not only for the bilateral relationship but for the environmental health and human security of this densely populated region. The future of the Ganges, and the millions who depend upon it, hinges on navigating these troubled waters successfully.

"We must keep in touch with the other side. In 2011 it was agreed upon by both sides that from now on, separate water sharing models will be followed for separate rivers and basins. Fourteen years have passed since; there have been little discussions about this here. Yet in India, civil society and experts are consistently in discussion about these issues," said Dr Nishat