What are the measures required for accountability and non-repetition of enforced disappearances?
The final report of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, released today (13 January), exposes the systematic nature of enforced disappearances in Bangladesh and lays out measures aimed at preventing their recurrence, ensuring accountability, and restoring public trust.
Titled "Unfolding the Truth: A Structural Diagnosis of Enforced Disappearance in Bangladesh", the report's chapter on Measures Required for Accountability and Non-Repetition states, "Enforced disappearance is not a partisan political issue and should not be made one. As the examples below demonstrate, under Sheikh Hasina, it affected everyone."
According to the report, the human cost of sustaining the Awami League's rule has been staggering. Lives were lost, careers shattered, education cut short, and families torn apart. Survivors continue to bear deep psychological and physical scars, often worsened by years spent entangled in fabricated legal cases.
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The report notes that the criminal justice system was often used as an instrument of repression. In the sample analysed, the median legal cost borne by a victim is Tk700,000 – almost twice the average annual household income – while cases drag on for years, draining families and communities of stability, security, and hope.
The report also highlights instances of illegal cross-border transfers of victims through covert rendition practices.
The report further points out that even security forces were not spared. Demoralised by institutional complicity and compromised by the presence of culpable actors within their ranks—many now vulnerable to hostile intelligence services and posing potential threats to national security—the forces require deep reform to resist future political pressure of a similar nature.
The commission concludes that the Awami League's regime of fear affected people of all strata of society, across political lines, and stresses the need for a unified national effort to eradicate this culture altogether.
The final chapter of the report translates the commission's findings into measures aimed at preventing recurrence and enabling lawful accountability, with the objective of a durable reset: dismantling the conditions that enabled enforced disappearances and restoring public trust.
In its interim reports, the commission recommended enacting laws criminalising enforced disappearance, including recognition of its continuing nature and the application of command and superior responsibility. It also called for establishing specialised, independent investigative bodies.
The interim government has since enacted ordinances addressing these concerns, which must now be ratified by the next government through Parliament. The report outlines the remaining work required to consolidate these reforms.
Here's what the report says
Dismantle the institutional machinery of disappearance
The Government must dismantle RAB.
RAB has been at the centre of the system of enforced disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial killing described in this report. Its legal mandate, operational culture, and chain of command have proved resistant to reform. The force should therefore be wound up as an institution, with transitional arrangements that protect evidence and enable prosecutions. Any future specialised units must be placed under strict civilian oversight, with narrow mandates and independent monitoring.
The Government should withdraw the armed forces from domestic law enforcement roles.
Military officers have repeatedly occupied senior positions in law enforcement and intelligence organisations that were central to the system of secret detention and scripted prosecutions. Through deputation, military chains of command were extended into civilian policing, eroding clear lines of accountability. These composite arrangements exposed both military and police officers to unlawful practices and corruption, placing personnel trained for fundamentally different roles into hybrid command structures that weakened professional standards and normalised misconduct. Such arrangements should be phased out and prohibited in the future, with civilian expertise restored and strengthened within the relevant institutions.
The disciplined forces must address coercive career incentives, provide redress for past retaliatory practices, and reform evaluations to prevent recurrence.
The Commission heard repeated testimony that officers who resisted participating in unlawful operations faced tangible retaliation, including adverse performance reports, manipulated course results that undermined merit-based promotion, stalled careers, punitive postings, and withdrawal from UN peacekeeping missions. Over time, these coercive incentives fostered a culture in which participation in illegality became normalised as a condition of professional survival. This culture must be confronted directly. Internal review mechanisms should identify personnel whose records reflect retaliatory downgrading linked to refusal to engage in unlawful acts and provide appropriate redress. At the same time, future evaluation systems should reward lawful restraint and respect for rights, rather than obedience at any cost. Without addressing these internal dynamics, resentment within the ranks will persist, leaving institutions vulnerable to renewed politicisation and future cycles of abuse.
The Government must strengthen judicial capacity.
The Government must substantially strengthen the judiciary through increased staffing and modern infrastructure. At present, 4.5 million pending cases are being handled by only around 2,294 judges, an imbalance that undermines timely and effective justice. Without sufficient manpower and institutional support, judicial independence cannot be meaningfully exercised. If law-enforcement agencies and the wider public lose confidence in the judiciary's ability to act fairly and promptly, extra-legal practices become more likely and may even gain public acceptance. Such an erosion of trust would be deeply harmful, entrenching illegality and weakening the rule of law.
Reform counter-terrorism laws and practices
The Anti-Terrorism Act 2009 should be repealed or fundamentally amended.
The Act, including its 2012 amendments, has been repeatedly misused to initiate politically motivated or fabricated cases against individuals held in secret detention. Vague and expansive definitions of "terrorist activities" have enabled this abuse, while the inclusion of the death penalty has significantly raised the stakes of such prosecutions. The Government should therefore clarify and narrow the definition of terrorism to prevent its continued misuse.
The Government should adopt a strategic policy to counter terrorism that prioritises community-based prevention over militarised repression.
Counter-terrorism should be grounded in engagement with locally trusted actors and institutions, including religious leaders, educators, and civil society organisations, and in rehabilitation and deradicalisation programmes for those at risk. Extremism must be addressed at its roots through social policy, education, and inclusion, rather than being treated solely as a law enforcement problem managed through special laws and exceptional force. Learning from successful regional examples, rather than wholesale adoption of militarised US counter-terrorism norms, is key.
The Government must reform the relevant laws to remove any incentives for extra-legal detention and coercion.
Law enforcement agencies have repeatedly argued that investigations into terrorism and ideologically motivated crimes require longer pre-charge detention than those permitted under existing law, and that this constraint has driven officers toward unlawful detention and coercive practices. To counter this argument, we recommend preventive detention of suspects as per the law of the land (The Special Powers Act, 1974). However, some amendments may be made to allow limited delays in family notification where courts are satisfied that there is a genuine risk of accomplices fleeing, accompanied by mandatory reporting to the judiciary, including via video technology if needed. Such reforms would allow law enforcement to operate flexibly but lawfully, protect the rights of the accused, and align Bangladesh's legal framework with evolving regional approaches to such crimes.
The judiciary must address the weaponisation of the criminal justice system.
The justice system must confront the use of criminal law as a tool of repression, particularly regarding the Anti-Terrorism Tribunals. Cases involving potential victims of enforced disappearance should be prioritised in light of the structural realities documented in this report. Judges must be equipped, through systematic training and orientation, to recognise patterns of secret detention, coerced confessions, and fabricated evidence, and to exclude unlawfully obtained material or order institutional inquiries where appropriate. Many victims have endured years of pre-trial detention, repeated adjournments, and the constant threat of capital punishment, making prompt and structured review essential. Where judicial conduct contributed to the misuse of criminal law, institutional mechanisms should also examine failures of due diligence during the previous regime, including in the recording and acceptance of coerced Section 164 confessions. Addressing both backlog-driven delay and institutional failure is necessary to restore confidence in the administration of justice and prevent recurrence.
Strengthen accountability for law enforcement and intelligence agencies
The Government must repeal Section 13 of the Armed Police Battalion Act 2003. This provision grants members of law enforcement immunity for acts done "in good faith," which in practice has blocked victims' access to justice and shielded perpetrators behind a vague standard. Its repeal is necessary to bring the forces into line with constitutional guarantees and international standards that forbid blanket immunities for serious human rights violations.
The Government must depoliticise all law enforcement and intelligence forces.
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been repeatedly drawn into partisan political work at the direction of governing parties. The use of state security institutions for political purposes must cease. Bureaus within intelligence agencies tasked with political surveillance or partisan activity must be dismantled.
The Government must codify the legal mandates of intelligence agencies.
Clear statutory frameworks must define the lawful functions, limits, and accountability structures of intelligence agencies, so officers are not left to operate in legal grey zones. Where questioning of suspects requires secrecy for justified national security reasons, the law should permit the production of detainees before a specially designated judicial authority with appropriate security clearance, including by video where necessary. This would preserve confidentiality while upholding the fundamental requirement of judicial oversight, preventing incommunicado detention and abuse, and ensuring that security operations remain anchored in the rule of law.
The Government must invest in the professional capacity of law enforcement.
Law enforcement in Bangladesh remains understaffed, under-equipped, and underfunded, conditions that have weakened investigations and incentivised coercive practices. These deficits must be addressed through sustained public funding, increased manpower, and modern investigative infrastructure. Officers should receive rigorous training in lawful investigation, evidence-based case construction, and forensic methods, so that prosecutions can meet judicial standards without reliance on coerced confessions. Capacity building should include carefully structured international partnerships focused on technical skills, forensic science, and rights-compliant investigation, rather than wholesale importation of foreign counter-terrorism doctrines. Past experiences show that externally driven security models can distort priorities and produce harmful outcomes if adopted uncritically. Future cooperation should therefore be selective and grounded in domestic strategic priorities, with the aim of strengthening professional competence.
The Government must institute regular, mandatory human rights training for members of law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Training should cover international human rights and humanitarian standards, relevant UN conventions, and the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. It should be practical and scenario-based, with clear guidance on lawful arrest, custody, interrogation, and use of force, and should be repeated throughout an officer's career rather than treated as a one-off exercise.
The Government must treat unresolved criminal liability within the security sector as an active national security vulnerability and address it through credible accountability or transitional justice processes.
Officials who remain in service while facing credible allegations of serious criminal conduct may become vulnerable to blackmail, coercion, and manipulation by hostile intelligence services seeking leverage over State institutions. At the same time, individuals who have absconded abroad, as well as those who facilitated such flight, can continue to pose risks through witness intimidation, interference with investigations, disinformation, and the maintenance of illicit networks. These are not only accountability concerns but also ongoing security threats.
The Government should therefore establish clear pathways to resolve these risks: either (i) prosecutorial routes with specialised investigative capacity, witness protection, and effective international cooperation (mutual legal assistance, asset tracing, and, where appropriate, extradition), or (ii) transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth-seeking and healing processes, vetting and institutional reform, and other structured measures designed to secure disclosure, protect victims, prevent recurrence, and remove leverage that hostile actors can exploit. Any approach must be grounded in due process, independent oversight, and transparent criteria, so that security sector integrity is restored without substituting one form of arbitrariness for another.
Victim-centred justice, reparation, and rehabilitation
The Government must ensure reparation and rehabilitation are central to any reform process.
Families of the disappeared have suffered profound psychological, social, and economic harm. Many lost primary breadwinners, while others exhausted their resources pursuing legal remedies in cases built on fabricated or weak evidence. Survivors also continue to bear lasting physical injuries and psychological trauma, compounded by false criminal cases that restrict employment, mobility, and social reintegration. Those returning to society after torture and prolonged detention often experience social isolation, loss of livelihood, and a deep erosion of trust in the State.
Beyond the injustice of this situation, these conditions can also be exploited by extremist networks and generate long-term security risks. In close consultation with victims and families, the Government should implement a comprehensive reparation and rehabilitation policy addressing both families and survivors. This should include financial compensation, access to healthcare, trauma-informed mental health services and education, legal assistance to clear false cases, employment reintegration support, and formal acknowledgment of wrongdoing.
The Government must ensure victims and witnesses are protected and supported throughout investigative and judicial processes.
Any new investigative unit and prosecutorial mechanism must incorporate robust witness-protection measures, including relocation and identity protection where necessary, to ensure that survivors, witnesses, and whistle-blowers can testify without fear of retaliation.
The Government must ensure the preservation and memorialisation of former secret detention sites.
Former secret detention facilities must be formally preserved and converted into public museums and sites of memory and education. Without memorialisation and public access, documented abuses risk fading from collective consciousness, creating space for denialist narratives that contest or minimise what occurred and weaken accountability and collective reckoning. Even sites located in areas requiring heightened security, such as within cantonments or other restricted zones, must be preserved as memorial sites, with access structured for appropriate audiences, such as security-sector cadets.
The Government must act promptly to publicly memorialise these locations, as delay risks their gradual loss through neglect, decay, and ordinary wear, resulting in the irreversible erosion of their historical and evidentiary value.
Enhance constructive engagement and cooperation under UN human rights mechanisms
The Government must extend a standing invitation to the UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures.
Extending a standing invitation to the UN Human Rights Council Special Procedures would reflect Bangladesh's continued commitment to constructive engagement with international human rights mechanisms. Such cooperation would allow independent UN mandate-holders, including the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, to provide technical expertise and constructive recommendations to support national efforts to address allegations of enforced disappearances and strengthen safeguards related to arrest, detention, and accountability. Regular and unrestricted engagement with Special Procedures would contribute to the identification of structural gaps, enhance preventive measures, and support the alignment of security-sector practices with international human rights standards, consistent with Bangladesh's international obligations.
The Government should withdraw its reservation from Article 14(1) of the UN Convention against Torture and recognise the competence of the Committee Against Torture.
Withdrawing the reservation to Article 14(1) of the Convention against Torture and recognising the competence of the Committee Against Torture under Article 22 would strengthen Bangladesh's engagement with international treaty bodies, enhance access to remedies for victims, and support the effective implementation of the Convention. Such steps would demonstrate the State's commitment to accountability, transparency, and compliance with its international human rights obligations, consistent with cooperation with UN human rights mechanisms.
The Government should establish a National Preventive Mechanism to operationalise the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture.
Bangladesh is a State party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT), which requires the establishment of an independent National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) to conduct regular visits to places of deprivation of liberty. The absence of an operational NPM limits the State's capacity to prevent torture and other ill-treatment through systematic monitoring. Establishing an NPM would support compliance with OPCAT obligations, strengthen safeguards against abuse, and enhance transparency and accountability in detention practices.
Implemented together, these recommendations amount to more than a set of technical fixes. They require the State to abandon the informal system of disappearance and scripted justice that has taken root over the past decade and a half. Taken as a whole, they would enable the replacement of that system with institutions that are transparent, accountable, and centred on rights, while also creating clear legal and procedural space for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to operate effectively within the rule of law.
