Really a reset? What the Delhi meet between the two NSAs signals for troubled India-Bangladesh ties
There was no official word from the Indian side on the meeting. So, speculations soared about the issues, more so after the Bangladesh foreign ministry’s statement post-ICT verdict.
The meeting between Bangladeshi National Security Adviser (NSA) Khalilur Rahman and his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval met on 19 November in New Delhi, it raised quite a few eyebrows for two reasons.
First, it came a day after the International Crimes Tribunal in Dhaka sentenced ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Secondly, Bangladesh Foreign Ministry's statement within hours of the court ruling making a fresh push for Hasina's extradition, ironically under a 2013 bilateral agreement signed when she was in power, was framed in a sharp language.
Just look at the most hard-hitting Bangladesh foreign ministry statement: "Providing refuge to these individuals, who have been convicted of crimes against humanity, by any other country would be a highly unfriendly act and a disregard for justice." It reads. India refrained from responding to it. Even India's terse two-paragraph reaction to the ICT ruling was highly restrained and understandable.
"India has noted the verdict announced by the "International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh" concerning former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. As a close neighbour, India remains committed to the best interests of the people of Bangladesh, including in peace, democracy, inclusion, and stability in that country. We will always engage constructively with all stakeholders to that end," read the terse MEA statement.
It is in this backdrop that the meeting between Rahman and Doval took place on 19 November. While the main purpose of Rahman's visit to Delhi was to attend a meeting of India-spearheaded Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), it is the interface between the two NSAs that completely eclipsed the multilateral event the next day.
Assuming that New Delhi was not happy with the Bangladesh Foreign Ministry statement after Hasina's death penalty was passed, it could have declined to host a bilateral meeting of the two NSAs. But that did not happen. Why? It is very tempting to interpret this as a "breaking the ice" (the words used in a story on The Print website) and a "reset" (as mentioned in an analysis in Frontline) in bilateral ties.
What transpired at the meeting between the two NSAs?
The Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi issued a brief statement to the media saying "key bilateral issues" were discussed between Rahman and Doval. But it did not specify the issues. There was no official word from the Indian side on the meeting. So, speculations soared about the issues, more so after the Bangladesh foreign ministry's statement post-ICT verdict.
It was Rahman's speech at the CSC meeting the next day (20 November) that gave an insight into what is going on in the mind of Bangladesh. The two biggest talking points of the speech were: (1) flagging the issue of Bangladesh being subjected to "minisinformation and disinformation" in recent days and (2) Bangladesh does not allow any exogenous or indigenous forces to challenge the security and well-being of the people in the Indian Ocean Region and any part thereof. While the first point was mainly aimed at the domestic audience in Bangladesh where anger brewed at what was allegedly an exaggerated reportage by a section of the Indian media.
The second point seeks to address India's concerns over security issues emanating from Bangladesh. Both the points were made in a balancing act of diplomacy by the Bangladesh NSA on his maiden visit to India and his first meeting with his Indian counterpart. Whether this is just a one-off event or is enough to keep the high-level engagement between Bangladesh and India going remains to be seen.
Given the free fall suffered by India-Bangladesh ties since the change of guard in Dhaka, any attempt to look for light at the end of the tunnel is a risky proposition. It is relevant to recall how a leading Bangladeshi newspaper rushed to conclude that the long-awaited meeting between Yunus and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 3 April on the sidelines of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Summit in Bangkok was a "positive sign" for the bilateral relationship. The first in-person engagement between the two leaders was thought by some in Dhaka as holding out the hope for improved ties between the two neighbouring countries.
But the hard truth is that the relations have only deteriorated further in the subsequent months. Isn't it too much to expect the two NSAs to succeed when their top leaders failed to arrest the slide. What it shows more than that is India-Bangladesh relations at present have acquired enormous complexity that defies a straight way out.
Will the relations become more problematic with the approaching national elections in Bangladesh and the rising anti-India tide in the country?
Veena Sikri, who served as India's High Commissioner to Bangladesh from 2003 to 2006, said the neighbouring country is once again "very polarized politically" which does not augur well for its stability and security. This polarization is going to accentuate in view of the elections, she added.
Another former diplomat Rajiv Dogra said "provocative" statements had been issued in the past by Bangladesh's top leaders in the interim government in the past and it does not augur well for the future as elections are on the cards there.
He cautioned Bangladesh is "once again very thoroughly polarised and that is something which is worrisome."
Anil Trigunayat, another retired Indian diplomat, said a politically divided Bangladesh has the potential of further destabilisation "which will not be good for India as well as for the subcontinent."
These observations were made during panel discussions on various TV channels on 17 November.
Some have suggested that Doval's assertion at a seminar in New Delhi on October 31 that "poor governance" was the reason behind uprisings that led to change of governments in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka over the past three and half years could be seen as New Delhi's first indication of its acceptance of the reality in Bangladesh post-Hasina and an outreach to a new dispensation that emerges after the election there.
The fact is that it requires a knowledge of history to find out how India has learnt to accept a non-Awami League government in Dhaka from time to time. India has engaged with H M Ershad and Begum Khaleda Zia governments. It is equally true that the quality of the engagement was markedly different because of India's comfort level with them.
