Israeli-Palestinian peace through two-state solution a pipe dream

The recent launch of surprise large-scale attacks by militant group Hamas from the Gaza Strip against Israel, followed by Israel's subsequent declaration of war on Hamas over the last week, have set the stage for a major military operation in Gaza. 

Israel's military said Hamas' attack and ongoing rocket fire had killed more than 1,300 people as of 13 October, with confirmation that at least 27 Americans were among the casualties.

In Gaza, the Health Ministry reported that Israel's retaliatory strikes have claimed the lives of at least 1,537 people, including 447 children, while leaving more than 6,600 others wounded.

Consequently, the question of whether Israeli-Palestinian peace can be achieved through a two-state solution, involving the creation of separate states for the Jewish and Palestinian peoples (Israel and Palestine), has once again become a prominent issue at the forefront of international discussions.

But providing a suitable response to this query hinges on the answers to several subsidiary questions, encompassing reasons for the failures of previous peace processes, the feasibility of a two-state solution at present, and the progression of the Arab-Israeli peace processes that evolved independently of the Israeli-Palestinian one.

And the answers to all these questions unmistakably indicate one simple answer: No, the prospect of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process through a two-state solution is currently nowhere to be seen. 

How did Israeli-Palestinian peace processes fail over the years?

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an enduring and seemingly insoluble dispute in contemporary history, has defied numerous efforts at finding a solution throughout the years.

Nathan Thrall, an American journalist based in Jerusalem, wrote in his book 'The Only Language They Understand: Forcing Compromise in Israel and Palestine' that the repeated failures of peace negotiations are not primarily due to tactical mistakes or imperfect circumstances, rather stem from the fact that Israel, as the more powerful party, prefers the status quo and the costs associated with it over making the concessions required for a peace agreement.

The conflict has its roots dating back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries when Zionist Jews started arriving in Palestine with the dream of creating a Jewish homeland. This influx of Jewish immigrants sparked escalating tensions with the Arab population over competing claims to the land.

In 1947, the United Nations introduced the UN Partition Plan for Palestine, proposing the division of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, along with an international zone encompassing Jerusalem and Bethlehem. While Jewish leaders accepted the plan, Arab states gave it the cold shoulder, leading to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

This war resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs, giving rise to the Palestinian refugee crisis. Between 1949 and 1967, there were intermittent conflicts, but no notable attempts at peace were on the horizon.

The pivotal Six-Day War in 1967 led to Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights, further complicating the prospects for a two-state solution.

The First Intifada, a Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule which began in 1987, had a profound impact on the conflict and eventually cleared the path for the Oslo Accords in 1993.

In September 1993, the then Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the then Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat shook hands on the White House lawn to seal the first agreement between Jews and Palestinians to end their conflict and share the holy land along the River Jordan that they both call home.

The peace agreement signed by Arafat at that time was known as the Oslo I Accord. It entailed a commitment to engage in negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict through a two-state solution, envisioning the creation of two separate states: Israel for the Jewish people and Palestine for the Palestinian people.

In theory, this approach could provide Israel with enhanced security and enable it to maintain a Jewish demographic majority, preserving the country's Jewish and democratic character, all while granting the Palestinians their own state.

Remarkably, Benjamin Netanyahu, who would go on to become Israel Prime Minister in 1996, opposed the 1993 Oslo I Accord. So resolute was his opposition that he didn't hesitate to draw comparisons between the architects of the peace deal and Neville Chamberlain, along with other European leaders who appeased Hitler during the 1930s. 

"You are far worse than Chamberlain. You are endangering the security and freedom of your own people," Netanyahu raged at Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in a speech to Parliament. "We will use all legitimate means at the disposal of a democratic opposition to stop this foolish process, which endangers the very future of the country."

Nevertheless, the Oslo II Accord was signed in Taba, Egypt, in 1995, which also created the Palestinian Authority and laid out a framework for future talks on a two-state solution based on the idea of self-determination for the Palestinian people.

The Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, began in 2000 and involved a resurgence of violence and unrest in the Palestinian territories, profoundly impacting the peace process.

In January 2001, many observers perceived the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as faltering. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat had declined a peace proposal from his Israeli counterpart, Ehud Barak, although there remains significant debate about the precise details of that offer. 

Additionally, renewed negotiations failed to yield an agreement, and escalating violence during the Second Intifada made the prospect of further talks appear increasingly improbable. Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, though significant, did not result in a lasting resolution and remained fraught with ongoing tensions.

The conflicts in Gaza in 2008-09 and 2014 also had a noteworthy impact on the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the peace process.

In November 2012, the United Nations General Assembly voted to grant Palestine non-member observer state status. This move was seen as a symbolic step toward international recognition of Palestinian statehood and gave the Palestinians access to certain international organisations and treaties.

However, in December 2017, the US officially recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and announced plans to relocate its embassy there. This move was widely criticised and led to unrest in the region.

In January 2020, the Trump administration released a new peace plan for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, known as the "Peace to Prosperity" plan. It proposed a two-state solution but included several controversial elements, such as recognising Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and Israeli settlements. The plan was not accepted by the Palestinian leadership.

According to many experts, the Trump administration's approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was flawed and lacked a political roadmap, and hence "the Middle East Peace Plan was doomed to fail." 

Current US president Joe Biden also reiterated his calls for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict last year, emphasising on a "lasting negotiated peace between the State of Israel and the Palestinian people." 

However, he also had bigger ambitions of negotiating a new alignment in the region by normalising relationships between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the guardian of Islam's two holiest sites. But now, with the recent eruption of violence, the US president's efforts could very well be imperilled. 

Is a two-state solution really viable?

The idea of a two-state solution has been supported by many countries and international organisations, including the United Nations, as the best way to achieve a lasting and just peace in the region. However, it seems extremely unlikely at this point, due to several obstacles standing in the way.

One of the main obstacles is the issue of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Israel has built settlements in the West Bank since it occupied the territory in 1967. However, these settlements have no legal validity and constitute flagrant violation of international law, United Nations Security Council reaffirmed in December 2016. 

As a result, they have been a major source of tension between Israel and Palestine over the years. While the Palestinians see the settlements as an obstacle to creating a viable Palestinian state, the Israelis argue that they have a right to build homes in their ancestral homeland.

Another obstacle revolves around the issue of Jerusalem. Both Israelis and Palestinians claim Jerusalem as their capital, and it is one of the most contentious issues in the conflict. The city is home to some of the holiest sites in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, making it a highly symbolic and emotional issue for both sides.

There are also disagreements over borders, security arrangements, and the status of Palestinian refugees. These issues have been discussed in numerous peace talks over the years but have yet to be resolved.

The division between Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Authority, which governs parts of the West Bank, has further complicated the prospects for a unified Palestinian state. This internal Palestinian split not only undermines the ability to negotiate with a single, representative Palestinian entity but also contributes to the overall instability of the region.

Writing in the New York Times in May 2021, Yousef Munayyer, a political analyst focusing on Palestinian issues, declared "a growing global consensus" that "the two-state solution is dead. Israel has killed it." 

Additionally, in August 2021, the influential US magazine Foreign Affairs conducted a survey that revealed even Western and Israeli pundits acknowledge that a two-state solution in Palestine is impossible.

This has also led some to argue that a one-state solution, which would merge Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into a single democratic country with equal rights for Arabs and Jews, is becoming more likely. 

Under this scenario, Arab Muslims would outnumber Jews, thus ending Israel's existence as a Jewish state. Nor would Palestinians have a state purely to call their own, instead having to accommodate a large Jewish minority.

Palestinian American academic Edward Said supported this solution, as he wrote in a 1999 New York Times article, "Oslo set the stage for separation, but real peace can come only with a binational Israeli-Palestinian state."

However,  Zack Beauchamp, a senior correspondent at Vox, opined that the one-state is even less likely to happen than a two-state solution. "It would involve the most powerful player in the conflict, Israel, choosing to abandon its raison d'être. It's far more likely to abandon West Bank settlements than to give up on Zionism wholesale," he wrote.

Notably, A one-state, one-nation solution was also advocated within Israel in as early as the 1940s and 1950s by the Canaanite movement where Arabic-speaking Palestinians would adopt a Hebrew-speaking Israeli identity (although not necessarily the Jewish religion).

Can Arab-Israeli peace processes develop bypassing the Israeli-Palestinian one?

Amidst the seemingly endless cycle of conflict and negotiations between Israel and Palestine, there have been instances of successful peace agreements between Israel and some of its Arab neighbours. 

The Camp David Accords, brokered by the United States and signed in 1978, marked a historic milestone in Israeli-Arab diplomacy. At the heart of this agreement was the normalisation of relations between Israel and Egypt, making Egypt the first Arab country to officially recognise the state of Israel. 

The motivations for Egypt were multi-faceted. Firstly, it was driven by its desire to regain the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had captured during the Six-Day War in 1967. Secondly, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sought to secure military aid and economic assistance from the United States, a significant incentive for Egypt's move towards peace.

The peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 followed a similar pattern of diplomatic engagement. King Hussein of Jordan, recognising the changing dynamics of the region after the end of the Cold War, sought to secure his country's eastern border and enhance economic cooperation. Like Egypt, Jordan also sought to receive American assistance, in the form of debt relief and financial aid.

Meanwhile in 1991, the Madrid Conference convened Israel and several Arab states, including Syria and Lebanon, for discussions on regional peace. Despite significant diplomatic efforts, the conference did not result in a comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East.

In a surprising turn of events, the Abraham Accords marked a significant breakthrough in Israeli-Arab diplomacy in 2020. Under the leadership of the Trump administration, Israel normalised relations with two Gulf Arab states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, with subsequent agreements involving Sudan and Morocco. These agreements represented a departure from the traditional approach to Middle East diplomacy.

These instances show that there is more to the chronicle of peace processes between Israel and other Arab nations, which do not address the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict directly. 

That said, in a bid to attain regional stability and global peace, a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a critical objective. For example, the ongoing Israel-Saudi Arabia normalisation plan brokered by the US is also falling victim to the Hamas attacks. 

US President Joe Biden had aspirations to reshape the Middle East and achieve a diplomatic win before the elections by obtaining Saudi Arabia's recognition of the Jewish state.

But with the recent attacks on Israel, Hamas is sending a clear message to both the Arab states and the United States that the Arab-Israeli peace processes cannot be developed bypassing the Israeli-Palestinian one.